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THE WAR OF THE WORLDS: A
FEW COMMENTS ON LAW,
CULTURE, AND RIGHTS
Lawrence M. Friedman

Bridges and Barricades,Professor L. Amede Obiora's article,'
raises and discusses a number of very basic questions. At one
level, the essay deals with a clash of culture systems; Western and
non-Western. The precise question on which the essay turns is the
(much-disputed) custom or practice of female circumcision among
African peoples, both in and out of Africa. But on a more fundamental level, the essay deals with the conflict between two realms
that the labels "Western" and "non-Western" do not fit quite so
well.
One is the realm of "fundamental human rights." The argument here is that there are certain basic standards of justice and
humanity; these are rights that are common property, and should
belong to every soul on earth. Such rights do not vary from place
to place; they are truly universal.2 Obiora quotes from Article 5 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the very name is
significant): no one "shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."3 In the United States,
people would tend to associate fundamental standards with the

t Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University.
1. L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence
in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 275 (1997).
2. Whether they are also timeless is another question; probably most people never
seriously consider this question. Most people, if they thought about it, might agree with
Rainer Baub6ck that these rights are "historically but not culturally relative" and are highly relevant for all present societies. RAINER BAUBOCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENsHIp:
MEmERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MI1GRATION 239 (1994) (discussing human
rights as universalized citizenship).
3. Obiora, supra note 1, at 277.
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provisions of the Bill of Rights, and the body of case law that has
been built up on this foundation.
The idea of "universal human rights" stands in opposition to
something else called "culture." "Culture" is more personal, local,
and time-bound. Arguably, one of the "fundamental human rights"
is precisely the right to practice and enjoy one's own culture; or
perhaps the culture of one's choice. But cultures themselves are
never "universal;" indeed, the very essence of a culture is that it is
special, local, particular, that it belongs to a certain people or
community and to nobody else.
The question raised is, what to do when these two realms
come in conflict, when there is a collision between a "human
right" and a cultural practice? How can we decide between these
two? I believe that most contemporary people would say that fundamental human rights have to trump the local, the particular, the
cultural; if a cultural practice violates fundamental human rights,
then it has to go. But so put, the conflict is not really a dispute on
the level of theory; it is a question of where to draw the line
between these two domains.
How, asks Obiora, can we "ensure that our presumptions and
assertions of universality are not veiled projections onto others of
our moral categories?" 4 How indeed. Nobody is likely to question
the idea that torture is a violation of some basic standard; nobody
is going to step forward in defense of torture. But we have to be
careful not to label some practice as "torture" that is imbedded in
a distinct culture, and that is not so defined (as torture) by the
members of that community. This is, in essence, what Obiora
warns us against.
There are, of course, dangers on the other side as well. I think
we have to be very careful about using "culture" as a defense or
excuse. Authoritarian regimes are quick to cry "culture" when their
tyranny is criticized. We are told, for example, that it is not part of
Saudi culture, based as it is on Islam, to let women drive cars,

although nobody, as far as I can see, ever formally consulted Saudi
women on that question. Perhaps Saudi women might agree; perhaps not. All sorts of authoritarian governments have explained to
an impatient world that their particular people are not "ready" for
democracy, or that democracy or due process are exotic imports

4. Il at 277-78.
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that do not suit their culture. We have to be quite skeptical about
any such arguments. Still, having said this, we cannot in the end
brush off the "culture" argument so cavalierly.
The term "culture," it hardly needs to be said, is vague and
difficult. I use the term here not in any technical sense, but simply
as another word for customs; that is, practices that are local and
transitory. "Culture" varies from place to place; indeed, in this
sense, culture is what divides human beings from each other. Every
human being has to eat and sleep, but not everybody has to eat
sushi or rest her head on a pillow. Unlike fundamental human
rights, which are the birthright (in theory) of every human being,
cultures are variable and varying. "Culture" can and does have a
range of meanings. It can refer to aspects of life that most people
would consider rather superficial: what color of clothes people
wear at funerals or what kind of holidays they celebrate. But "culture" can also refer to crucial, essential aspects of group life, marrow-deep beliefs and institutions, such that any alteration in this
"culture" can seriously injure or damage the group in its very
groupness. Language and religion are often "culture" in this sense.
Of course, how to map out boundaries between these two poles of
"culture" is not, in any case, an easy question.
In the 19th century, generally speaking, the West, through its
missionaries and explorers, treated the cultures of non-Western
people with little or no respect. The West was imperialist; it was
powerful and expansive. Its armies and navies came roaring out of
Europe to invade and conquer "lesser" people. It had the strength
to impose its will on what is now called the Third World. In fact,
the main obstacles were other European powers. France and England, for example, battled over spheres of influence in Africa.
Nobody consulted the Africans. Africans were savages. So were
other indigenous people such as Pacific Islanders and Latin American Indians. In the course of European expansion, the cultures of
most of these peoples were trampled underfoot. This was often
quite deliberate policy.
The process began, perhaps, as early as the 16th century. In
Mexico, the Spanish destroyed the temples of the Aztecs and built
churches on top of the ruins; they tried to do the same thing with
the Aztec mentality. The march of European conquest continued,
later, in Africa and in the Pacific. At the end of the 19th century,
the United States, which had been ruthlessly suppressing its native
populations, joined in the overseas game; it grabbed Puerto Rico
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and the Philippines, and annexed the Hawaiian Islands. Missionaries were often in the vanguard of the European empires. The padres built their missions up the coast of California and worked
hard to convert the Indians. Missionaries swarmed over Africa.
Missionaries transformed Hawaiian society. In every case, they
brought European religion, and European prejudices, to places that
were far away (from their standpoint) and thoroughly uncivilized.
They were more subtle than the soldiers, certainly less willing to
kill; but perhaps more thorough.
It is not popular today to defend the missionaries, at least not
in academic circles. But it might be worthwhile to try to understand them in their time and place. People in the 19th century, in
general, were not cultural relativists. They believed in progress
from lower to higher, and European civilization was definitely
higher than anything in Africa or Latin America or Oceania. Consequently, they drew the line we have mentioned in a very different way than we do today. I refer to the line between "culture"
and something more universal, something that trumped or superseded it. The missionaries did not care whether the natives ate
yams or not. But to the missionaries, religion (true religion), and
certain aspects of social structure (individual ownership of property,
the family farm system as opposed to communal land tenure,5 and
so on), were not "Western" or parochial, but were "civilized," in
short, pan-human. Their ideas of religion (and, to a lesser extent,
economic behavior) occupied, in other words, the same ideological
space that "fundamental human rights" do today.
Today, democracy and human rights are on one side of the
line, and religion (most definitely) has moved to the other. Interference with native religion is today certainly not accepted. Religion
is considered a matter of identity and culture, or at worst, a matter
of personal taste, or the individual quest for spirituality. This
assuredly falls within the realm of choice.6 And "culture," which

5. Getting rid of tribal systems of land tenure was a prime goal of national policy
toward the native peoples in the United States; it was expressed as policy in the infamous
Dawes Act of 1887, c.119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
349 (1994)). See DONALD L. PARMAN, INDIANS AND THE AMmUcAN WEST IN THE TWENTETH CENT RY 1-10 (1994). In part, the policy might have been nothing more than a
device to steal more land, but it did reflect a deeply-held belief that civilized people
operated on the family-farm system.
6. See LAWRENCE M. FRiEDMAN, THE REPUBuc OF CHOICE LAW, AUmoTrry, AND
CULTURE 164-69 (1990).
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the 19th century Western expansionists respected poorly if at all,
has also tended to move to the untouchable side of the line.
The missionaries, settlers, explorers, and conquerors at best
felt they had something to give to the poor heathens; at worst, in
the earlier phases, and in the settler communities (the United
States, Australia, Argentina), they were willing to stamp out the
people and their cultures with no more concern than when one
swats a fly. Cultural traffic went only one way. A trickle of gewgaws and artifacts were collected (or stolen) from the natives for
museums, or as curiosities and souvenirs; but that was just about
all. Even classic ethnography was one-sided. The non-Western
cultures were passive objects of study Western "culture" and
technology flowed from West to East, to Africa, Oceania, and
other parts of the world. In the period before contact, this "culture"
and "technology" was simply unavailable to the rest of the world.
As Europe expanded, it exported its machines and its mind-set to
the rest of the world. But the traffic, as we said, went only one
way. What came back was gold, lumber, tin, rubber, mineralsand slaves.
Today, of course, all this has changed. There are reciprocities
of interaction, between core and periphery, between the global and
the local, between the powerful and the powerless; there is a real
blurring of lines. Commodities now move in both directions. A
"commodity" is something that can be bought and sold-they are
literally or symbolically transferable, movable, portable. The movement from periphery to core started with a trickle of curios and
souvenirs, "native handicrafts" and the like; but today, primarily
because of low wages, the flow of commodities, even when the
commodities are, by nature, "Western," is apt to come from the
Third World. Sports shoes are manufactured in Indonesia. CocaCola is sold in Albania. It is hard to say that Coca-Cola is "Western" when everybody in the world now drinks it. Coca-Cola has
gone global. It is part of a world culture, a single cultural language, so to speak, split into a variety of dialects.
Human beings, too, are increasingly "commodities" in the
sense I have used the term. They are certainly portable, movable,
and transferable. Today, millions of people are on the move; all of

7. Classic ethnography did, however, treat indigenous cultures with respect, and even,
at times, romanticized them: it took them to be coherent structures that made sense in

their own terms, and did not dismiss them as "savage" or "primitive."
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the Western countries (and especially the big cities) are becoming
much more "cosmopolitan;" waves of refugees, asylum seekers, and
immigrants are dashing against all the shores Immigration, I
hardly need to remind the reader, is a major political issue in the
United States; and elsewhere as well (very notably in Western
Europe).
Movements of people are certainly nothing new in the world.
But there are some elements of current immigration which are, in
fact, rather different from aspects of past immigration. American
immigration law, in the 19th century, was noteworthy mostly because of what it did not do: it made no attempt to restrict immigration. This country was (apparently) open to anybody. The first
restrictions, late in the century, were directed against the Chinese.9
Only in the 20th century, very notably in the harsh and biased
statute of 1924,10 was there any concerted attempt to keep out
undesirables. The undesirables, aside from Asians, were peasants
from Southern and Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, the 1924 law did
nothing to control immigration from the Western hemisphere. In
theory, all of Honduras could have taken up residence in Los Angeles.
What was it that kept out the masses of Latin America, or for
that matter, the millions of Bengalis or Africans or Malays? What
kept all these people from knocking on the doors of the United
States, a rich and powerful country and a magnet for millions? The
sheer cost of travel is one answer. Indeed, the invention of the
steamship had a great impact on the late 19th century burst of
immigration from Europe." Travel became cheaper;, but it was
still far beyond the reach of the poorest of the poor, especially in
Asia and Africa.
I think, however, that another factor was even more crucial
than cost. Immigration is by and large an offshoot of modernization. Modem immigration demands a certain level of awareness, a
certain degree of sophistication, a certain amount of exposure to
the big, wide world. Truly traditional people do not move, if they

8. There is, of course, a huge literature on the subject. See, e.g., STEPHEN CASTLES,
MIGRANT WORKERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN SOcIETIES (1989).
9. See BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICAN THROUGH IMMIGRATION PoLIcy, 1850-1990 (1993).
10. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
11. See STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, ETHmCIrY, AND CLASS IN
AMERICA 34 (1989).
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can possibly help it. They stay put. They may even be totally
unaware of other ways of life. Modem communication, for example movies, radio, television, has brought images of the world into
homes or villages almost everywhere; for countless millions of
people, it has opened their eyes to distant possibilities; it has
shown them images and patterns other than the old familiar ones.
It has thus planted the seeds of rootlessness. It has evoked, in
other words, the urge to seek a fortune, or at least a living, and to
see the world. Poverty, hunger, and war help to push immigrants;
but the pull of the developed world depends on the images and
devices of modem communication. Once a "colony" is established
in New York or London, to be sure, letters home and rumors of
jobs complete the process.
This mobility is one of the underlying causes of culture clash.
After all, we can ask why female circumcision is an issue now in
France. It certainly was not on the agenda of French politics in the
19th century, or even in the 1930s or 1940s. France had other
things to worry about. Hence we face a kind of paradox. It is the
(partial) breakdown of traditional society that makes the new mobility possible. But aspects of traditional societies decay at different
rates. The "culture clash" that we find in France, or elsewhere, is a
result of this kind of differential decay (or, more neutrally, differential evolution or change). Africans now live in France; but they
are not "traditional" people in the same sense that their ancestors
were; they are modem people in many or most regards. This is the
point made earlier. One might argue, then, that the clash between
the Africans and the French, is not a clash between the modem
and the tradition, but a clash between different dialects of modernity.
That would not be so far off the mark. Africans living in
France watch TV, drive cars or ride busses, buy food at the supermarket, and go to the movies. They may be different from the
majority of the other people living in France, in various ways. But
they are probably far more different, and profoundly so, from their
own village ancestors of, say, some centuries ago. For that matter,
most of the French are profoundly different from their ancestors,
even those of not so long ago. 2 And they retain, from their past,

12. See EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL
FRANCE, 1870-1914 (1976). What is particularly striking in this important book is the
description of exactly how isolated and traditional life was in rural France as recently as

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:379

vestiges of traditional France. But they do not really think of these
as "primitive" because they are familiar and accepted. When some
Muslim girls tried to wear head-coverings to school, it threw some
of the French into a panic. Wearing a crucifix, of course, would go
totally unnoticed and accepted.
The receiving societies have changed substantially since the
19th century. They now embrace (more or less) forms of cultural
pluralism, though often very reluctantly. This was certainly not the
case in the past. The Americans, for example, rushing to conquer
the continent, cared nothing at all about the cultures of the native
tribes. For people of good will, assimilation was the solution to the
"problem" of native Americans; 3 for people without good will,
extinction would do just as well. Very few people thought native
culture was worth preserving, or that it could be preserved, in
competition with "advanced" societies. Cultural pluralism, as a
value, is distinctly twentieth century. And, as we have argued, the
irony of modem cultural pluralism is that it is, at core, not entirely
pluralistic. All of the subgroups are, in their own way, modem.
There are groups on the margins that stretch this point a bit-the
Amish, to take an American example. But on the whole this generalization holds true.
Moreover, cultural pluralism has its political and social limits.
There is, to begin with, resistance, sometimes serious resistance,
from various segments of society. It is enough to mention the
crusade against affirmative action, the fuss over legal and illegal
immigration, and the "English Only" movement. Another limit, and
one more worthy of respect, is the notion of fundamental human
rights or fundamental human dignities. Of course, these ideas are
themselves culture-bound, and, perhaps even more important, they
are historically specific. Most of the notions that we think of as
"Western" are not "Western" but modem. They are the products of
a dramatic evolution, which began in the West, and which turned
traditional society inside-out. Indeed, torture (now outlawed, on
paper at least, as a violation of fundamental human rights) was
once a standard practice in Western legal systems.
But most people are not aware of history, and never think
about it. Nor, perhaps, would it make any difference to them. What

a century ago.
13. Assimilation was also, of course, the solution to the "problem" of immigrants in

general.
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is important is the passionate sense of right in their guts-the
sense of entitlement. One of these "fundamental" rights is the right
to preserve a culture, as we mentioned before. But other "fundamental" rights can, and do, clash head-on with cultural claims.
How such clashes are to be resolved is not easy to say. It is in
this intersection, this zone of free fire, that Obiora's article can be
placed.

